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Abstract 
After the American Civil War, and the collapse of the market in slave-produced 
cotton in the South, cotton merchants in New Orleans faced challenges in re-
establishing the city as a central port for Southern cotton. As commodities 
exchanges emerged as centralized spaces for business in the 1870s, a new class of 
experts emerged, upon whose reports traders bought and sold newly developed 
securities derivatives. Henry G. Hester (1846- 1934), Secretary of the New Orleans 
Cotton Exchange, was an integral player in the development of the methods that 
governed sophisticated commodities trading around the world. His career at the 
New Orleans Cotton Exchange tells the story of the arrival of these methods and 
subsequent downfall of Euro-American centrality in the global cotton empire and 
contradicts previous histories that deemphasize Southern businesspersons’ 
contributions to modernization.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: futures, commodities, New South, experts, business, statistics, Civil War 
 
  
  1 
 
Introduction 
 
 Upon his retirement in December of 1932, Henry G. Hester’s career was the subject 
of business periodicals across the United States and Europe, reporting on his contributions 
to the business of cotton. For sixty-two years, Hester served as secretary and 
superintendent of the New Orleans Cotton Exchange -from its establishment in 1871 until 
his retirement, two years before his death. He was widely recognized as the “Grand Old 
Man of Cotton,” and the “Father of Cotton Statistics.”1 Hester’s Report, his annual analysis on 
conditions contributing to the marketing of cotton from the interior of the United States 
were circulated throughout business communities from Galveston to Tokyo and his model 
for analyzing trends in the production, manufacturing, and consumption of cotton products 
were emulated across markets. Henry Hester and the members of the New Orleans Cotton 
                                                        
1  These titles were attributed to Hester by businessmen throughout the cotton 
industry and recorded in an personal sketch by Frost O. Miegs in 1922.  
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Exchange brought cotton business interests back to New Orleans after the American Civil 
War, reestablishing the city as the primary “spot market”2 for cotton well into the twentieth 
century. Contrasting previous histories of the New Orleans Cotton Exchange and 
Reconstruction economics, this paper will argue that Hester’s career demonstrates 
changing business methods in the New Orleans after the Civil War.  
 Historians have remarked on the decreasing role played by the New Orleans 
business community in the national economy during and after the Civil War. The once great 
city had been hailed as a Southern metropolis and a geographical asset since being 
acquired by the United States in 1803.  Its strategic position at the mouth of the Mississippi 
River made it a center for agricultural exports and by the 1850s, New Orleans reigned over 
international cotton production. By that time, nearly 79 percent of cotton produced in the 
Southern United States was exported through New Orleans. However, with the outbreak of 
the Civil War and subsequent blockade of Southern cotton, exports collapsed and would 
never return to their former glory. Historian Scott Marler argues that even before the Civil 
War, the strategic position of New Orleans contributed to a lackadaisical attitude among 
the city’s business community toward increasing competition from other Southern cities. 
The city’s business elites did not embrace the modernizing infrastructural technologies that 
would change methods of transportation and distribution, nor did they adequately address 
crises in banking and finance. Despite modernization in other Southern cities like Atlanta, 
New Orleans -Marler argues- remained complacent in its success as a regional port for 
southern cotton. The unwillingness to embrace a new order in finance contributed to New 
                                                        
2 In commodities trading, a “spot market” is a financial market where products are 
traded for immediate delivery, as opposed to a “futures market.” 
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Orleans’ fall from a “regional metropolis” to an irrelevant business center.3  This view of 
New Orleans’ business community fails to acknowledge broader changes in the 
globalization of cotton as well as individuals’ contributions to an emerging order of cotton 
financing. 
 The career of Henry G. Hester –“The Grand Old Man of Cotton”- and his colleagues at 
the New Orleans Cotton Exchange contradicts this portrayal and the degree to which the 
New Orleans business community was part of an ongoing progressive movement aimed at 
modernizing the cotton industry at the close of the nineteenth century. With the 
establishment of the New Orleans Cotton Exchange in 1871, cotton merchants brought the 
business of cotton back to the city, although not to its prewar levels. By offering a central 
location for trading, telegraph connections to the interior and other markets, and analyses 
of factors affecting price and distribution of the crop, the New Orleans Cotton Exchange 
members adapted to emerging business practices in the United States. While other 
historians have emphasized the relative unimportance of New Orleans as an agricultural 
export center after the Civil War, the career of Colonel Henry G. Hester demonstrates how 
the New Orleans business community contributed to emerging market behaviors at the end 
of the nineteenth century. As a new class of experts emerged to supplement traditional 
forms of exchange, Hester and the Cotton Exchange brought to the New Orleans business 
community precise reporting of agricultural conditions, discussion of external pressures to 
the market (including labor disputes and price panics), and the perception of expert 
                                                        
3 Marler, Scott P. The Merchants’ Capital: New Orleans and the Political Economy of the 
Nineteenth-Century South. New York, 2013. Cambridge University Press. 9-11 
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authority, all of which informed the trading of the newly developed securities derivative, 
the “futures contract.” 
Historiography 
The overlay between politics and business in what C. Vann Woodward refers to as 
the “New South” has been part of the classic discussion among historians about the legacy 
of the institution of slavery, the American Civil War, and Reconstruction. Woodward 
describes the transformation of conservative politics, as Democrats in the former 
Confederacy began taking on the political mantle of traditionalist Whigs. As this evolution 
was taking place in the decades following the Civil War, Democrats began to bifurcate, with 
some Southern conservatives filling the ranks of New South businessmen.4 This new 
political class of “redeemers” had a tangible effect on the politics and business of the South, 
more so than the former Confederate planter class, as well as the Reconstruction Radicals.5 
Henry G. Hester, with his decades-spanning career at the New Orleans Cotton Exchange, 
was a part of this emerging class of business-driven Democrats who would shape the New 
South in the twentieth century.  
 Woodward’s argument in regards to the reforming of the Southern business 
community after Reconstruction follows a theme of discontinuity in the makeup of financial 
elites within the South.  In Woodward’s view, during Reconstruction, Southern business 
models and methods in governing began to reflect the models of those in the north. He 
shows how after the Civil War, even the most successful planter capitalists faced an uphill 
climb in reclaiming their former economic status, as the emancipation of Southern slaves 
                                                        
4 Woodward, C. Vann. Origins of the New South. 1951. Louisiana State University 
Press. 6 
5 Woodward. Origins of the New South. 22 
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took from them a major source of capital and credit.6 Thus, new business methods created 
by Northern Republicans during Reconstruction resulted in the appearance of a new 
middle class. Other scholars as well point to a degree of politico-economic discontinuity in 
the post-bellum South, arguing for the emergence of a new business class representing its 
own interests at the expense of agrarians and poor tenant farmers.7 
 Interest in cotton production has increased among historians recently, with new 
studies connecting U.S. cotton production to the broader global economic changes brought 
on by economic developments in the nineteenth century. In his book Empire of Cotton: a 
Global History, Sven Beckert uses historical changes in the production of cotton to form a 
narrative of the changing economic and political relationships between individuals, states, 
and colonial powers. One recurring theme in Beckert’s work is his reference to “war 
capitalism,” a system of economic expansion that reconfigures the relationships between 
farmers, weavers, distributors, and merchants in colonial economies, replacing traditional 
modes of production with European technology and European dominance over the export 
of cotton cloth. Such a framework allows Beckert to give an analysis of the peculiar rise of 
the British cotton empire, a system of production and distribution centered in a continent 
that neither grew nor widely used cotton until the British colonized parts of Southeast 
                                                        
6 Such a conception of emancipated slaves as a piece of property is not meant to 
diminish the humanity of those Americans who fell victim to the institution of slavery, or to 
cast slave-holding planters as victims of financially ruinous social policy. Instead, it is 
meant to put the economic effects of emancipation into the contemporary economic 
context of the time. Enslaved individuals held value as property and sources of credit, and 
regardless of the moral depravity of viewing another human being as a commodity, an 
economic analysis of the history of the South must take into account Southern modes of 
finance.  
7 Woodward, Origins. 240, Woodman, Harold D. “The Political Economy of the New 
South: Retrospects and Prospects.” The Journal of Southern History 67, no. 4. (Nov., 2001): 
789-810 
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Asia.8 While Beckert gives a critical look at how colonialism and the birth of modern 
capitalism are intertwined with one another, his is largely a history of the rise and fall of 
cotton production in Europe and the United States and its relationship to capitalism. This 
project fits into a time frame far smaller than Beckert’s, and attempts to describe how 
Hester’s methods redirected the postbellum South on a path towards modern exchange 
models. 
 Localized subjects such as the New Orleans Cotton Exchange tend to limit the scope 
of an inquiry to a shorter historical period. Marler’s analysis of the role of the New Orleans 
Cotton Exchange in regional and national competitiveness appears to remain intact when 
comparing New Orleans as a center for exports to the relocation of these trading hotspots 
to new cotton metropolises on the Atlantic coast and Texas, but such an analysis fails to 
consider broader economic changes in the marketing of cotton to the world, as well as the 
role that individuals play in shaping business culture. In regards to the latter, Hester’s 
methods for reporting the statistics on cotton received international recognition in most of 
the major cotton producing nations throughout the world. His purported expertise and 
consulting career with the U.S. Department of Agriculture demonstrate that he was an 
important figure in developing national perceptions of commodities trading, predating the 
rise of professional statisticians that emerged early in the twentieth century. 
 In addition to the restructuring of modes of production throughout the globe, cotton 
production, as well as the development of industrial capitalism, developed in tandem with 
the violent exploitation of African slaves whose labor supplied European mills with raw 
                                                        
8 Beckert, Sven. Empire of Cotton: A Global History. (New York: 2014) Alfred A. Knopf. 
56-63 
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materials. 9 Edward E. Baptist, in his work on the institution of slavery in the U.S. South, 
demonstrates how this profitable, finance-driven industry of the nineteenth century 
developed on the backs of enslaved people, toiling daily to plant and harvest the 
commodity upon which this analysis is centered. As technology increased the profitability 
of cotton, so too did it increase the number of enslaved Africans forcefully transplanted to 
the US South. In the last decade of the eighteenth century, the number of enslaved people 
imported into eleven southern states totaled 38,881. Thirty years later, the forced domestic 
migration of slaves into the South totaled 211,241. These states, the most prominent 
producers of cotton in the United States, built an agricultural empire on enslaved labor, and 
profited richly from their investments in human capital. In addition to giving a human face 
to the global empire of cotton, Baptist’s work demonstrates empirically how the institution 
of slavery grew in the Southern states leading up to the American Civil War, countering the 
Whiggish historical perspective of slavery’s unimportance to the war between North and 
South and positions the cotton industry as an important development in our national 
history, a subject that is typically relegated to regional histories of the Southern states. This 
structure of exploited labor also lays the foundation for future problems faced by Southern 
planters attempting to switch to new, free models of labor after Reconstruction. 
 Hester and the men who established the NOCE represented a new way of doing 
business in the South, imitative of Northern business models, while also employing their 
own methods. In 1871, Hester and his colleagues stood at the cusp of an industry 
transitioning from the dominating interests of the planter class represented by “factor” 
intermediaries, to a system dominated by merchants, railroad and shipping companies, and 
                                                        
9 Beckert. Empire of Cotton. 98-120 
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textile manufacturers represented by brokers in metropolitan export centers. Additionally, 
they represented a broader cultural shift toward evidence-driven analysis and the 
authoritative testimony of experts. 
 The Market, they believed, could be understood through graphing and charting past 
performance, and they would promote the business of cotton by reforming the way traders 
behaved. This effort to reinforce the foundations of industry with scientific knowledge was 
reflective of the larger Progressive movement in the South at the time. The study of the 
Progressive era of American history frequently focuses on the politics of social reform. An 
Atlantic-wide movement of individuals and groups began seeking the reform of politics into 
a system of government based on investigation and analysis. This new appeal to evidence-
based analysis, however, represented a shifting of political authority away from the state 
and into the hands of capital holders and industry elites.10 In this context, we can see that 
Hester’s evidence-based analysis of the cotton trade represented more than an effort to 
standardize and streamline a poorly organized system of trading. His appeal to objectivity –
as well as the industry’s appeal to his authority- allowed Hester to create a prototype for 
government reporting and analysis. In the waning decades of the nineteenth century, 
Progressives emerged under the auspices of expert authority, to address social problems, 
gather evidence, and provide policy recommendations for governments. The development 
of professional academic associations specializing in economics, political science, and 
                                                        
10 Rodgers, Daniel T. Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age. (Cambridge: 
1998) 52-53. 
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sociology signaled a larger cultural movement away from idealism.11 Previous studies of 
the Progressive era, however have both a geographical and institutional bias.  
 Defining “progressivism” as a distinct movement has proved problematic for 
historians of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Lacking a underlying ethos 
or set of common beliefs, self-described progressives are best grouped by their attempts to 
address social ills through hierarchical, extra-party political organizations. Characterized 
by their bureaucratic hierarchies, depending on large data inputs and policy 
recommendations, progressive organizations streamlines the political process through 
ward bosses, county and city groups, and directed efforts upwards to political institutions 
of power. In addition, their efforts to “modernize” geographies and institutions reflected 
their desire to bring cosmopolitan conformity to local communities. Racial politics and the 
enfranchisement of African Americans after the American Civil War also influenced the 
formation of these groups as they sought to streamline a dearth of constituents to support 
their particular brand of politics and business. The confluence of these new political 
developments as well as a cosmopolitan modernization of businesses in the United States 
helped shape the politics of New Orleans at the turn of the century. Henry G. Hester and his 
colleagues at the New Orleans Cotton Exchange exemplify this modernization process in 
politics and business.12 
Classic studies like The Emergence of Professional Social Sciences by Thomas L. 
Haskell focus on the history and development of academic institutions dedicated to 
                                                        
11 Haskell, Thomas L. The Emergence of Professional Social Sciences: The American 
Social Science Association and the Nineteenth-Century Crisis of Authority. 65-68 
12  For more on progressivism and modernization, see Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for 
Order: 1877-1922. Also, Daniel T. Rodgers, “In Search of Progressivism,” Reviews in 
American History, Vol. 10, No. 4. 
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evidence-based analysis. Using the American Social Science Association as a contextual 
lens, Haskell demonstrates how positivist attitudes of professionals during the nineteenth 
century shaped the modern social sciences. What is left out, however, is the role of non-
academic professionals and institutions, especially those outside of the Northern United 
States. Hester and the men at the New Orleans Cotton Exchange certainly represented a 
new professionalized institution of scientifically minded businessmen whose interests 
were not in academic knowledge, but in keeping the South’s agricultural market center to 
the global cotton trade. While his politics and motivations for doing so were not as 
altruistic, the legacy of Hester’s methods influenced an international system of quantifying 
and reporting information. As Progressives attempted to address the social ills of the 
backwards South, Southern businessmen were witnessing and responding to broad 
changes in the American cotton industry. 
Cotton Exchanges Before Hester 
 Among the few images associated with the New Orleans Cotton business, The 
painting, A Cotton Office in New Orleans, is arguably (FIG. #1) the most familiar. When 
Degas visited his family in New Orleans in 1873, he began painting the portrait reminiscent 
of the realist school that he would soon be famous for superseding. The painting itself 
captures a scene of cotton merchants running their hands through the plush commodity, 
examining its quality, and recording their observations. The crowded room of businessmen 
is emblematic of the fast-paced nature of industrial expansion, and historians have at 
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numerous times used the image as a metaphor for nineteenth century capital expansion13. 
The reality of the cotton situation, however, is far different from Degas’s painting.14  
 
Figure 1: A Cotton Office in New Orleans 
 
                                                        
13 The image serves as the cover for Eric Hobsbawm’s The Age of Capital, as well 
Thomas L. Haskell’s, The Culture of the Market: Historical Essays. For more on Degas’ 
painting, see Marilyn R. Brown, Degas and the Business of Art: A Cotton Office in New 
Orleans. 
14 Marler, Merchants’ Capital. 2-3 
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 Figure #2: Cotton Merchants in New Orleans 
 
 At the forefront of A Cotton Office in New Orleans sits Michel Musson, Degas’s uncle 
and lead partner at Musson, Prestidge & Co. Musson was the son of the wealthy merchant 
who had opened the firm, and until the 1870s operated in the city as a successful cotton 
merchant. Musson & Co. was a firm that was part of the antebellum business model of the 
“cotton factor.” Prior to the establishment of single centralized exchange and the expansion 
of railroad infrastructure into the U.S. Cotton South, farmers hired men like Musson to 
represent their financial interests in the city. Until the Civil War, factors functioned as 
financial middlemen—as intermediaries between farmers and merchants—arranging 
buyers for crops that would then be consumed locally or transported to ports throughout 
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the United States. In addition, factors also provided financial services by functioning as 
sources of credit for farmers, or securing credit within the city.  Woodman also describes a 
deeper connection between factors and their clients, as most of them served the interests 
of the same farmers for years. After the explosion in cotton production in the 1830s, many 
farmers increased the production of the cash crop at the expense of growing foodstuffs. As 
a result, the factor often secured for the farmer manufactured goods sold in the city. In 
some cases, factors would even find schools or universities for the children of farmers. 
However, by the 1850s, the “factorage system” of cotton going to the market would be 
challenged by emerging sources of available credit and finished goods within rural 
communities.15 
 By 1873, the status of the cotton factor in New Orleans was more akin to Degas’ 
lesser-known painting, Cotton Merchants in New Orleans (FIG. #2). Contrasting the busy 
image of his first painting, Degas’s second depiction is more emblematic of the artist’s now 
famous method of impressionism. In it, Michel Musson stands, staring pensively at a table, 
his hands slowly sinking into a sample of cotton. Instead of a busy office filled with 
merchants, only three men, including Musson, surround the dreary scene. Just a few weeks 
after Degas completed his painting, Musson, Prestidge, and Co. would close its doors 
permanently, reflective of the larger changes in how cotton moved from farm to factory in 
the Reconstruction South.16  
 The events of the Civil War had substantially disrupted the business of cotton in 
New Orleans and despite the monumental changes in the structure of cotton financing and 
                                                        
15 Woodman, Harold D. “The Decline of Cotton Factorage After the Civil War.” The 
American Historical Review, Vol. 71, No. 4. (July 1966), 1219-1296. 
16 Marler, Merchants’ Capital. 7-9 
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transportation, by the 1870’s, individuals within the New Orleans business community 
increasingly sought to reestablish themselves as brokers between farmers and buyers. At 
this time, small offices located around Gravier and Carondelet, calling themselves “cotton 
exchanges” served as meeting places for buyers and sellers. There was no central 
organization to manage risk factors or standardize measures on deliveries, and the 
exchanges competed with one another to secure the business of those offering to buy or 
sell deliveries of cotton. A small collection of business men sought to improve on this 
loosely connected group of individual exchanges and in 1870, began planning for the 
opening of the first major cotton exchange in New Orleans. 
Establishment and Hester’s Early Years 
 Henry G. Hester was born in New Orleans, in November of 1846 to Charles and 
Sarah Hester. The Hesters migrated from England some time before the birth of their first 
son in 1838. It is unclear why the Hesters chose New Orleans as their home, but Charles’s 
profession as a collier suggests that he was a merchant.17  Henry attended secondary school 
in the city and subsequently began a career in law, clerking for a district Judge. After 
abandoning his career in law, Hester began as a financial journalist. At the time of the 
Exchange’s establishment in 1871, Hester was working as an editor for the New Orleans 
Picayune.18  
 Hester married Frances Lea at the age of 21, with whom he had at least two 
children. His marriage lasted until his wife’s death in 1900, three years after the tragic 
                                                        
17 U.S. Census Bureau, New Orleans, Ward 11, Orleans, Louisiana. 1860 
18 Myers, William E. The Convention of ’98. Democratic Party State Central Committee, 
La: 1898.  20 
  
  15 
death of his son, Harrison, who died in a boating accident in 1897.19 After the death of his 
first wife, Hester remarried to Laura Dickson, a widowed mother of two children, Emma 
and Sulye Dickson. By 1910, Hester and Laura (along with her two children) rented a house 
on St. Charles Street in the fourteenth ward of New Orleans. An area populated by the city’s 
political and financial elite, Hester’s dwelling here demonstrates his position within the 
business community: an integral, but bureaucratic, figure for the cotton business.20 
Eighteen men involved in the New Orleans cotton trade established the New Orleans 
Cotton Exchange in 1871, the stated purpose being to “promote the business of cotton,” as 
well as supply information pertinent to those who bought and sold the cash crop. Henry G. 
Hester invested his time and expertise upon the opening of the Exchange, while other 
founding members invested their money and reputation.  An interview with Hester 
provides a retrospective into the beginnings of his career at the exchange. In a 1922 
interview, nearing the end of his career, Hester recalled the moment the President of the 
Exchange approached him offering him a position. He was working as a reporter with a 
handsome salary when Exchange President E.H. Summers called for him to appear in his 
office. Summers offered Hester the position of superintendent, a position whose duties 
were not yet determined. He offered Hester an annual salary of $2,500, stating that those 
invested in the endeavor stood to lose $10,000. Hester refused the salary, agreeing to take 
the job on the condition that he have the latitude to determine his own duties. “If you can 
risk your ten thousand dollars, I can risk my time. Forget about the salary. I’m going to see 
                                                        
19 Find a Grave, database and images (http://findagrave.com : accessed 25 March, 2016) 
memorial page for Henry G. Hester (1843-1934) Find A Grave Memorial no. 21281899, citing 
Metairie Cemetery, Metairie, Jefferson Parish, Louisiana. 
20  U.S. Census Bureau. New Orleans, Ward 14, Orleans Parish, Louisiana. 1870, 1910 
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what I can do with this job,” Hester recalled saying.21 Hester’s claim to have not initially 
taken a salary is open to question, but the story sheds light on the moment of the 
Exchange’s establishment as well as the uncertainty in its success and risk assumed by 
those who established it. 
 By the early 1870s, contracts for future delivery or “futures” were increasingly 
traded on commodity exchanges in the place of “spot contracts.” The Times Picayune article 
that announced the opening of the New Orleans Cotton Exchange stated that the first trade 
on the Exchange was actually a futures contract. However, traders’ wide use of futures 
contracts on various cotton exchanges did not eliminate the widespread perception that 
them as a source of financial instability. Critics equated these unconventional methods with 
gambling, calling them “immoral” and “unnatural.” 22 Even as late as 1919, the United States 
Department of Agriculture questioned their use in the exchanges. In one telegram, Hester 
defends the use of futures contracts, explaining to the acting chief of the Bureau of Markets, 
George Livingston, that they serve an invaluable function to traders.23 Hester’s telegram 
argued that futures contracts allowed traders to hedge regular spot positions and decrease 
their exposure to falling prices.24 Hester did not invent the futures contract, but he was 
                                                        
21 Frost, Meigs O. “’Hester Says-‘ an Intimate Personal Sketch of the World’s Greatest 
Cotton Authority.” New Orleans Sunday States. 1922.  
22 Aroni, Julius. Futures. (New Orleans: 1882) J.A. Gresham. 
23 Hester to Livingston, 22 December 1919, Box 1, Folder 3, Correspondence, New 
Orleans Cotton Exchange Records 1871-1979, LaRC, Tulane University Libraries. 
24 A trader’s ultimate goal is to offset all risk in a transaction. Because price fluctuation 
makes this essentially impossible, the trader may “hedge” a trade, in this case by taking a 
long or short position on a futures contract.  For example, if the trader for Sterling Cotton 
knows he will be selling an order of 20,000 bales of cotton in the future where the spot 
price is $11 per bale and the futures price is $10 per bale, the trader can take a short 
position on futures and close the contract when it has come to call, ensuring that he will 
receive $10 for each bale of cotton, rather than risk the spot price falling to $9. 
  
  17 
instrumental in bringing this financial innovation to the cotton exchange in an effort to 
modernize the business of cotton. 
 There were two types of markets for cotton during the later nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries; the distributive “spot” markets, wherein traders exchanged physical 
cotton for delivery on-site, and futures markets, where traders could hedge spot trades in 
order to reduce the risk of doing business. Reducing the risk of carrying actual cotton to the 
market was only possible when taking into account accurate information. Understanding 
how the futures market functioned in tandem with spot trading is essential to 
understanding the value of Hester’s reports. 
 As shippers carried cotton from the field to the market, their price margin (the 
difference between their buying price and selling price) had to be enough to pay for 
operation costs as well as gain a profit on the transaction. Ideally, a shipper would bring 
cotton to a distributive market and sell it at a higher price than that for which he purchased 
it. That difference –or margin- had to be enough to pay for the cost of shipping, handling, 
and financing cotton but also had to produce a profit for the shipper. If, when the shipper 
arrived at the distributive market, prices did not cover the margin, he would lose money. 
To mitigate this risk, a shipper would take the opposite position in a cotton futures market 
by purchasing futures contracts through a broker member of the exchange.25  
 Additionally, a futures market allowed a shipper to sell excess cotton that exceeded 
the amount the buyer wished to purchase. For instance, if a spinner placed an order for 
1,000 bales of cotton to be delivered later in the year, the shipper then sought out a farmer 
                                                        
25 For a contemporary description of the function of futures, see Alston Hill Garside, 
Cotton Goes to the Market. For more on the early development of futures contracts, see 
William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis. For an economic explanation of futures, see Jerome L. 
Stein, The Economic of Futures Markets. 
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with an expected crop of cotton that matched the classification required. The farmer 
however wanted to sell his entire crop. Thus, the shipper buought from the farmer 3,000 
bales. The shipper could immediately sell the excess 2,000 bales for “future delivery” to 
another shipper who wished to hedge his position on his own crop. While these practical 
applications served as justification for the existence of these financial instruments, traders 
on the exchange began using futures in other innovative, controversial ways. 
 As futures contracts became more prevalent on the New Orleans Cotton Exchange, 
brokers began speculating on the short-term price of futures themselves. When derivatives 
are exchanged in a market, it provides an opportunity for quick gains if a trader can 
accurately predict –or guess- how the price will rise and fall. If a trader believes the price of 
futures contracts will fall, he may choose to buy 500 bales of futures, despite the fact that 
he actually does not own any (this is understood as “selling short”). Because there is time 
between the point of sale and the time when the market closes, he still has an opportunity 
to purchase the amount of contracts he just sold from a different broker. If his prediction 
was correct, and the price does fall, he can then purchase at a lower price. At the close of 
business that day, he will have sold 500 bales of futures at the higher price and bought 
them at the lower price, clearing the difference. The problem of speculation, however, is 
that it causes volatility in the market.26  
 If we take the previous example of the speculating trader and put him on the trading 
floor with dozens of other traders, who can all see his actions, a problem emerges. If 
enough traders join the first in “selling short” on the future contracts, this will cause the 
price to fall indefinitely. This aspect of futures trading became endemic in the exchanges 
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during the 1870s, and critics challenged the wisdom, morality, and validity of such 
contracts.  
 Julius Aroni, a member of the New Orleans Bar Association, published a collection of 
court cases in 1882, two years after futures trading became standardized in the bylaws of 
the New Orleans Cotton Exchange. His reasoning was to educate lawyers representing 
clients who dealt in futures contracts as to the legal precedents that justified their existence 
and validity. In compiling court cases from across the United States and Great Britain, Aroni 
provides a legal defense of futures contacts, challenging much of the typical criticisms, 
mainly that the contracts constitute a mutual understanding between a seller and a buyer, 
just as any other contract. The content of this document demonstrates both that these new 
financial methods were controversial, and that there was a clear need for lawyers to 
understand the legal aspects concerning this financial instrument that was gaining 
popularity in the midst of controversy.27  
Hester’s Role in Daily Business 
 Henry Hester’s most notable function at the Exchange was to issue reports on 
factors affecting the cotton business, consisting mostly of reports from the previous years. 
He also examined market conditions, including market panics, shortages, surpluses, and 
price falls. Hester sought to understand the underlying factors affecting the price of cotton 
and published his findings for all members to see, with the authority of an expert. The rise 
of the social sciences in the United States reports in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century meant a more scientific, rational approach to a variety of social problems, and 
agricultural seem to reflect this trend in numbers-based analysis. This is not to say that 
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prior to the 1870s that financial analysis was not evidence based, but that laying out 
numbers in charts and graphs became an increasingly popular way to inform readers of the 
changes in industry. 
 Hester corresponded often with officials at the Departments of Agriculture and 
Commerce, sometimes representing the interests of members of the Exchange. Established 
as an independent department with cabinet status in 1862, the Department of Agriculture 
acted as the federal government’s chief collector of agricultural information, similar to that 
in Hester’s reports. The Department of Commerce acted to promote economic growth and 
job creation. Much of Hester’s correspondence with these departments seemed to be 
advisory in nature.  In a telegram from December of 1919, Hester wrote to John Hohn of the 
Division of Statistics at the Department of Commerce to correct their published figures on 
cotton holdings that year. Hester contended that the figures published by the Department 
of Commerce did not match his own, and explained how their numbers failed to represent 
the actual amount of cotton coming to market that year by failing to include some of the 
key export sites for cotton. “Comparing your figures with mine, for period August to 
November 1919… I find the following Differences.”28  He goes on to correct discrepancies 
that underestimated exports by 133,843 bales over a four-month period. In that period, the 
New York ports exported 75,204 bales, putting into context the scope of the discrepancy. 
Hester wrote a similar letter to the Federal Reserve Board, Division of Analysis and 
Research correcting their numbers on the 16th of the same month. Mistakes in the data 
were likely commonplace, but Hester’s readiness to correct mistakes as well as supply his 
own accurate numbers demonstrate that he closely watched official data coming from the 
                                                        
28 Hester to John Hohn. New Orleans Cotton Exchange Records, 652, Box 1, File 3, p 
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federal government regarding cotton, and that he had the ability to provide expert 
information to the official agencies overseeing agricultural analysis.  
Hester’s Reporting 
A series of telegrams sent from Hester to various individuals throughout the cotton 
interior and export cities could provide evidence of Hester’s methods for collecting the 
information in his reports. Three of the individuals that Hester refers to as “freight traffic 
managers,” employed at various railroad companies including the Louisville & Nashville 
Rail Road and the Texas Mexico Railway Company. He also sent similar telegrams to J.O. 
Davis, a collector of customs in San Francisco. In the telegrams, Hester requested that each 
recipient send him the latest figures they have on information “that would be valuable to 
the business of cotton.” While the collection referenced does not include the information 
provided by the freight managers or the customs collector, the requests demonstrate the 
way that Hester may have compiled his reports by maintaining daily correspondence with 
officials who may have insight into information regarding the production and movement of 
cotton, before a crop arrived at one of the dozens of exchanges and cotton presses. In 
telegrams sent the same day, Hester thanked the men for their cooperation for the previous 
year, wished them happy holidays, and included a box of “100 Havana cigars” to arrive 
through the mail.29 
                                                        
29 Hester to C.M. Fish, 16 December 1919, Fox 1, Folder 1, Correspondence, New 
Orleans Cotton Exchange Records 1871-1979, Louisiana Research Collection, Tulane 
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Figure #3: The above image depicts a typical chart that would be part of Hester’s report. This 
chart appeared in a 1904 publication on the commercial valuation of railways in the United 
States. 
 
 Hester’s reports on cotton appeared in trade journals and small reference books 
issued to traders for quick referencing. The Cotton Yearbook, published in 1923 by the New 
Orleans Cotton Exchange and edited by Charles Griffith, contained pertinent information 
regarding the growth, production, and consumption of cotton from the previous year and 
included Hester’s annual report. Hester’s report was largely a table of information 
comparing various aspects of the cotton trade to the same aspects of previous years, 
broken down into monthly intervals. The report also included a narrative introduction, 
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speculating on the business of cotton that year, prescribing solutions for downturns in the 
market, and recommendations for traders.30 His reports also appeared alongside those of 
other experts in publications issued in 1905 by the Department of Commerce and Labor. 
This document included a table of information collected by Hester. One table shows net 
receipts of cotton deliveries from ports across the country, including New York, New 
Orleans, Savannah, and San Francisco. Another table includes the production and 
consumption of cotton from 1880 to 1905, broken down into North and South, showing 
that a person could recognize that during this time, cotton production had more than 
doubled in the South and that annual consumption had increased by about one million 
bales in the North and by about two million in the South. 31  
 Hester’s testimony in periodicals around the time of his retirement portray him as a 
man whose methods were ahead of his time in terms of objective financial reporting. To 
maintain the integrity of his reports, Hester barred any of his employees from holding 
interests in cotton, including owning a single bale. The sources that informed Hester’s 
reports provided actionable information for traders, and being the first person to see the 
compiled numbers put the Colonel and members of his office in an advantageous position 
as informed insiders.32 In an interview with Rose Lee Martin of the Houston Post, Hester 
                                                        
30 Hester, “Annual Report on Cotton Corp of the United States,” Cotton Year Book. Ed. 
C.B. Griffith, 1923. Williams Research Center, New Orleans, Louisiana. 
31 North, S.N.D. Commercial Valuation of Railway Operating Property in the United 
States: 1904. Washington, 1905. Government Printing Office. P 14-15. 
32 By “insider,” I mean to describe the current understanding of the word: illegally 
trading securities based on material, non-public or proprietary information available to the 
trader through his or her position within a company. A famous example of insider trading 
is the case of ImClone Systems, wherein numerous executives at ImClone sold their stock in 
the company just prior to revealing that the company had failed to get FDA approval for a 
much-anticipated drug. An investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
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opines that acting on the information available to him, he and his employees “…could have 
been millionaires… and we aren’t millionaires. But we have our honor.” He claimed to have 
never owned a bale of cotton in his life, or never to have had financial interest in the trade 
beyond the salary he collected for his position.33 Thus, well before the Securities Act of 
1933, which barred insider trading, Hester recognized the impropriety of acting on non-
public information and avoided the appearance of conflicted interests all together. 
 However above reproach Hester’s office may have been to critics of commodities 
trading, his integrity did not go unquestioned. During a 1914 investigation by the Senate 
Committee on Agriculture, Senator Smith of South Carolina questioned Hester’s numbers 
by implying the Colonel had financial interest in the Lancashire mills in England. It is not 
clear from his testimony what prompted this accusation, but Smith meant to question the 
reliability of the information that Hester had provided in his reports. Shortly after his 
testimony, Senator Ransdell of Louisiana encouraged Smith to recant and later in the 
proceedings, Smith would apologize for the misunderstanding in front of the committee 
stating that, “It is a fact that the world does accept Mr. Hester’s statement as being official, 
as he is looked upon as the statistician for the cotton interests of the world.” There is very 
little to suggest that Smith’s implications about Hester’s financial interests were accurate, 
but the episode does illustrate Hester’s reputation as a man above reproach and an 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
resulted in the arrest of numerous ImClone executives, as well as Martha Stewart, who sold 
her stock in the company after being tipped off by her broker.  
33 Martin, Rose Lee. “Colonel Henry G. Hester… Grand Old Man of Cotton.” Houston 
Post. April 24, 1934. Williams Research Center. 
  
  25 
authority on cotton statistics. In addition, it shines light on a relationship between Hester 
and his congressional representation.34 
 To make sense the numbers Hester provides as actionable information for traders, 
one must understand the politico-economic situation in the United States, and the 
implications for the South’s economy. Natalie Ring illustrates how the production of cotton 
as a major cash crop in the post-war South posed problems for the region’s long-term 
stability. Treating cotton as the South’s major source of economic growth intertwined the 
regional economy with commodity pricing that was subject to wide fluctuation resulting 
from circumstances that were mostly out of anyone’s control. Unpredictable levels of 
rainfall could significantly alter the amount of cotton produced, making projections 
difficult. Devastation brought by insects could ruin an entire years’ crop.  These 
unpredictable circumstances usually resulted in bringing cotton from the previous year’s 
crop to the market, which had devastating effects on cotton growers seeking to gain the 
highest price to repay debts accumulated throughout the year. To combat the perception of 
cotton as an unreliable source of economic growth, boosters appeared throughout the 
country whose purpose it was to promote the business of cotton as a viable form of 
industry. While there is much literature on cotton boosters in the United States, little 
analysis has focused on individuals like Hester, whose business it was to provide hard facts 
about the cotton industry while promoting the crop as a viable basis for regional economic 
growth. 
 By the 1920s, Hester’s expertise was well established within the community of 
cotton businessmen. During times of crisis, the Board of Directors of the New Orleans 
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Cotton Exchange would call on the Secretary to instill confidence by publishing a report 
about the existing conditions. One such panic in the summer of 1920 threatened to see 
cotton prices fall off of the chart, and mills “throwing over-board” their supplies of nearly 
worthless cotton. The price per bale of cotton had dropped nearly 48 percent between 
August and October, resulting in a prevailing fear among “Southern Producers” that the 
price of cotton would fall below production costs. Upon hearing the fears of producers, 
cotton mills in Europe and the United States began flooding the market with stock supplies 
of lint cotton in hopes to sell their stocks, further intensifying the drop in price. Hester 
referenced Census Bureau statistics and described a decrease in stock supplies in Europe 
and the United States of about 788,000 bales between July 31st and October. In other 
words, in a span of three months, mills that had strategically held excess stocks of cotton 
staples in order to maintain steady pricing had brought twenty seven percent of that excess 
to the market, where demand was already falling. The original drop in demand expressed 
by producers compounded with excess stocks flooding the market threatened a panic, 
wherein the price of cotton would continue to drop until producers and mills regained 
confidence and resumed storing cotton staples.35 
 The Board of the Directors at the Cotton Exchange responded by issuing a report, 
authored by Hester, in which he argued for the stability of long-term demand. Recalling a 
similar panic from 1914, when cotton prices fell during the outbreak of the first World War, 
Hester reasoned that just as in the past, markets in Europe would continue to buy cotton 
and that mills should not be overly concerned with carrying over cotton supplies to the 
next year.  
                                                        
35 Hester, Henry G. Cotton Situation. October 20th, 1920 and October 14th, 1926. 
“Explains Fall in Cotton,” New York Times. October 21, 1920. 29 
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“War or no war, the world needed our cotton and that if the channels of trade 
were blocked for a time, a way would be found to open them in the near 
future…Why then should we after four seasons in which our raw cotton… had 
exceeded in value seven billions, nine hundred and seventy millions of dollars, 
balk at carrying a few million bales pending a temporary lull in demand.” 
 
 Prices would stabilize by the end of the year, and there is no way to measure the 
effectiveness of Hester’s remarks.  Still, it is clear from the Board’s issuing of the report that 
they believed by informing participants in the market of the real conditions of cotton crop 
they could prevent a panic. They would issue a similar report in October of 1926, when 
rumors of increased supply again caused mills to slow their buying while waiting to see 
how far prices would drop. In the latter report, Hester urged producers to hold their prices 
steady, at which time he predicted mills would resume normal purchasing.36 
Hester and Politics 
 Hester’s role within New Orleans politics reflected a wider set of political norms 
throughout the country, as voting rights were extended to larger parts of the population. 
More voters meant a new political machine in American cities. After Jacksonian Democrats 
expanded the voting rights of white men in the 1830s, organizations began popping up to 
direct the political will of newly enfranchised voters.37 In New York during the 1850s, 
William M. Tweed, the “Boss” of the Tammany Hall political machine, mobilized the votes of 
Irish Catholics as his base for political capital and successfully positioned himself and his 
society of Democrats as brokers of power in the city. Similarly, the Choctaw Club in New 
Orleans represented the interests of businessmen and powerful citizens, while deriving its 
power from a broad base of supporters in the community. Machine politics functioned as a 
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37 For more on Jackson and white populism during the 1830s, see Baptist, Edward E. 
The Half has Never been Told: Slavery and the Making of American Capitalism. 218-219, 224-
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hierarchical system, distributing power in exchange for political support, most often in the 
form of delivering voters to the polls. While the organization promoted nefarious 
operations including gambling and prostitution in Storyville, the Choctaw Club’s level of 
corruption did not rise to that of Tammany Hall’s, an organization whose most notable 
leader died in prison after being convicted of corruption. Hester’s membership in the 
Choctaw club, however, gives evidence to the important social and political connections 
associated with his position within the New Orleans business community. 
 Locally, the Choctaw Club’s members represented the higher echelons of New 
Orleans politics and business. Listed among its ranks were individuals with social and 
professional prestige, such as Henry C. Ramos (proprietor of the Sazerac Bar), Louis 
Grunewald (developer of the Roosevelt Hotel), and multiple port and railroad presidents. 
Among its politically minded operatives, the organization included U.S. Congressmen, 
judges, police commissioners and countless attorneys.38 These relationships provided more 
than simple comradery or social superiority, as local organizations became a central 
connecting point between business and politics in the city. This symbiotic relationship 
delivered to businessmen fast-tracking for their interests throughout the city, and for 
politicians, a group of socially prominent individuals to mobilize Democratic voters in the 
various neighborhoods throughout New Orleans. This quid pro quo relationship 
characterized much of the city’s business community. Hester was one of the many 
important businessmen throughout the city who prompted the strong relationship 
between the Democratic political machine and the business community.39 
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 Correspondence authored by Hester on behalf of the Exchange shows that the 
institution frequently involved itself in local, national, and international politics, especially 
when politics interfered with business. After the armistice of World War I, cotton 
businessmen were concerned over their inability to easily extend credit to European 
merchants, a practice that had been central to the business of cotton at the time. In a 
telegram sent to Senator Ransdell in 1919, the Board of Directors at the Exchange implored 
Congress to act swiftly in coming to a settlement in peace negotiations with post-war 
Europe. “While the war is over, the country and especially the cotton section is in many 
respects suffering the same as if war actually existed… pending a condition of peace, and 
the establishment of a known basis for the continuance of international trade, no adequate 
credit plans can possibly be established.”40 Ransdell was a frequent recipient of lobbying 
efforts on behalf of the Exchange, including a telegram calling for the expatriation of labor 
radicals, as well as one calling for opposition to trade restrictions proposed by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture. Thus, in addition to their role at the Exchange, cotton 
businessmen in New Orleans actively pursued issues that crossed over into politics when 
such issues affected their business. 
 A challenge in writing a history of the industry in New Orleans from the records of a 
financial institution comes in attempting to reconcile the rise of the New Orleans Cotton 
Exchange and the prosperity of its members with the farmers, sharecroppers, and laborers 
directly involved with producing, moving, and shipping cotton. Despite the fact that the 
problems of an agriculturally based economy in the South were widely reported by 
commercial journals throughout the post-Civil War period, cotton farming remained a 
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widespread way for small farmers to make money, and much of the population in the South 
dedicated increasing amounts of land to growing the cash crop. In addition, the industry 
relied upon workers to work the cotton presses and load shipments from the interior onto 
boats for export to the North and European markets. By the turn of the twentieth century, a 
progressive labor movement was in full swing, calling for higher wages and better working 
conditions. While the every day correspondence of the Cotton Exchange leaves little to be 
said about a worker’s experience, aside from numerical tabulations and predictions about 
how strikes may affect output, a few times the leaders of the Exchange acted unanimously 
to admonish labor movements. In one telegram sent on behalf of the Board of Directors and 
the Exchange President, Hester writes a scathing rebuke of the Industrial Workers of the 
World:  
The Congress of the United States should immediately enact a law 
providing for the summary deportation of every alien in this country 
who is a member of the I.W.W, or any other organization of like teaching 
and tendency and the said law should provide for the immediate 
cancellation of the citizenship papers of any naturalized citizen who shall 
affiliate with any such organization.41 
 
 Anti-IWW rhetoric in New Orleans echoes broader movements against organized 
labor throughout the United States at the time.42 The labor group’s intersection with textile 
mills was becoming palpable as early as 1912, with the  strike of workers in Lawrence, 
Massachusetts, as well as the 1913 silk strike in Patterson, New Jersey. While mill workers 
became increasingly marginalized by new technologies at the turn of the twentieth century, 
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anti-capitalist sentiment rose among minority workers not embraced by organizations like 
the American Federation of Labor. These workers became intrigued with the radical 
rhetoric of the IWW, and the rising number of members in such organizations had tangible 
consequences for industry leaders. In July of 1917, local authorities acted against striking 
mine workers in Bisbee, Arizona by deputizing a posse of citizens who then rounded up 
and deported 2,000 individuals alleged to have associations with the IWW. As Hester 
neared retirement, the Southern United States experienced a marked growth in the number 
of cotton mills, a huge part of the industrial labor in the region. Hester’s rebuke of the IWW, 
on behalf of the board of directors, demonstrates the Exchange’s entanglement in national 
issues of labor and culture, and episodes such as the deportation of striking mine workers 
in Bisbee, Arizona, demonstrate the measures some community leaders were willing to 
take to protect productive industries, whose corporate profits were being threatened by 
what they framed as anti-American views.  
Hester’s Retirement 
 Hester would continue to operate as secretary and superintendent of the New 
Orleans Cotton Exchange until his retirement at the age of 86. The Houston Chronicle said 
of Hester, upon his retirement in December of 1932, “before the United States government 
began to issue its estimates of the American crop [cotton], Hester’s figures were accepted 
as authoritative the world over.” According to the article, Hester’s reputation throughout 
the international community of cotton business people was once demonstrated when a 
Japanese admiral visited New Orleans and immediately said he “would be highly honored 
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to meet one of [the city’s] citizens, ‘a man greatly admired and respected in my country. I 
refer to Mr. Hester.’” 43  
 A London publication entitled The American Syren and Shipping has Hester as a 
member of the Progressive Union League, honorary member of the Naval Battalion, and 
belonging to the Boston, Pickwick, Merchants’, Young Men’s Gymnastic and Choctaw club.44 
Upon his retirement, Hester received a cablegram from Norman L. Cappel, president of the 
Liverpool Cotton Exchange that read, “On behalf of members of the Liverpool Cotton 
Association may I offer you our sincere congratulations on your distinguished career as 
secretary of the New Orleans Cotton Exchange for such a long period… Your name for years 
to come will be recognized as one of those who have been famous in the world of cotton 
and although only few of our members have met you personally we feel that during your 
term of office you have shown yourself to be a man of wide views and friendly feelings to 
this and all other cotton exchanges with whom you have corresponded. May years of good 
health and enjoyment follow your retirement.” By the time Hester retired in 1832, his 
family owned a Jefferson Avenue home along the boundary of the prestigious fourteenth 
ward of New Orleans, valued at $25,000.45  
Conclusions 
 
 In his memoir, The Age of Turbulence, Alan Greenspan recalls where he was during 
the collapse of the American housing market in 2008. Flying back to New York, the former 
chair of the Federal Reserve of the United States contemplated the long-term consequences 
of the financial meltdown, while formulating a strategy to calm markets upon his arrival. 
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He explains that prior to addressing the public on “just what the hell was going on that 
week,” he understood how his words might affect investors’ behavior, possibly 
exacerbating an already calamitous situation. He admits that despite his comparatively 
optimistic address, privately he had deep concerns over how difficult economic recovery 
would be for the country. The parallels between such an influential figure as Mr. Greenspan 
and Colonel Henry Hester are that both men (and the people they represented) understood 
how their words could influence the business cycle. Thus, a point can be made about 
Hester’s character of authority, his speaking to farmers, brokers, and manufacturers in 
order to calm the market during times of crisis. As fields such as finance and economics 
become bogged down with jargon and empirical analysis, it is important to acknowledge 
the role played by individuals in shaping the behaviors that contribute to how markets 
function.  
In terms of New Orleans’s rise and fall as an entrepot for exporting raw cotton, 
when placed in an international perspective, the city was simply one of the first institutions 
to lose influence during a sequence of events that moved cotton production from the 
United States and Europe first to peripheral nations and eventually into low-wage 
economies like China, where production remains today. In a sense, arguing that New 
Orleans fell from its place in the cotton empire assumes that it logically occupied such 
space to begin with, as opposed to being part of a broader economic empire artificially 
constructed through colonial exploitation. Broadening the scope of Marler’s analysis by 
only a few decades demonstrates that the fall of New Orleans as a central metropolis for 
cotton exporting is emblematic of larger changes in the shape of the global cotton empire. 
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Even in its fall from grace, the New Orleans business community was, ironically, ahead of 
its time. 
The argument proposed by Woodward and Woodman appears to be more nuanced 
than a case of Northern businesses usurping economic power in the South. While there was 
a contradiction between the poverty experienced by rural farmers and the prosperity of 
traders on the exchange, one can see when reviewing the career of Henry G. Hester that 
Southern businessmen were active participants in constructing and maintaining the 
financial methods that appeared at the end of Reconstruction. As Woodward argues, large 
plantation owners continued to receive most of the profits from growing cotton while 
smaller farmers fell into debt, thus perpetuating a socioeconomic structure with the same 
planter families at the top of the hierarchy. However, Hester’s rise to prominence at the 
New Orleans Cotton Exchange is emblematic of a new class of experts that influenced how 
cotton was financed, traded, exported, measured, and analyzed. 
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